Relocation of the selling of Australia's wool clip from London to cities in Australia in the late nineteenth century led to the creation of wool selling industry associations, such as the Melbourne Woolbrokers Association (MWA). Highly successful in fostering competitive collaboration that improved market efficiency, the Association rested on the social capital brought to it and further developed by the participants, individuals with extensive connections in the pastoral, banking and transport industries. The collective social capital vested in the Association enabled the earning of economic rents, firstly from the high trust created through internal cohesion reinforced by formalised sanctions, and secondly from a capacity to span 'structural holes' between networks outside of the Association.
Introduction
This study explores the role of industry associations as facilitators and beneficiaries of social capital through an examination of the establishment and early operation of the Melbourne Woolbrokers Association [thereafter MWA]. The emergence of the MWA in March 1890 was contingent upon the progressive relocation of the market for Australian wool from London to cities within Australia. 1 For the local market to compete with the old system of consignment to London, it had to offer additional benefits to the sellers, the local growers, and the buyers. Replacing the emergent local system of uncoordinated selling by individual brokers with a centralised point of sale operating with standardised rules and charges was critical to this process. Forming a new marketing institution required cooperation between broking firms that were also competitors. Moreover, transference of the physical market to Australia meant the weakening of social capital amongst those participating in the declining London market and required the creation of a bew set of relationships between actors in local networks to build social capital.
From its inception, the MWA was an effective organisation. That this was so is surprising given the severity of the problems facing the pastoral industry and most of the member firms in the 1890s. Squeezed by falling revenues and heavy debt repayments, several firms within the MWA faced bankruptcy during its first decade, and two of the original members of the MWA were absorbed by rival firms. Such a potentially unstable group of members might be thought to be inimical to the development of trust and cooperation.
Moreover, the end of the 1880s' boom, which had given rise to 'Marvellous Melbourne', revealed widespread corruption and dishonesty that touched many of those in the commercial and social circles in which members of the MWA moved. Relationships, personal and commercial, were re-evaluated as scandals came to light.
How was the MWA able to develop high levels of trust and effective cooperation between its members in such a difficult environment? The MWA was embedded in time and place, an energetic outpost of Victorian Britain. Over the previous 40 years, the City of Melbourne and the Colony of Victoria had received an influx of British migrants, capital, ideas and institutions. 3 They made up a society of joiners and participants, one with a strong associative capacity. 4 The flourishing colony was quickly populated with formal associations of all sorts -religious, mutual benefit, sporting, cultural and socialeach replete with constitutions, rules and mechanisms for dispute resolution. In its first decade the MWA evolved through two stages. Its formation was a defensive response to pressure from the newly organized wool buyers for a reduction in selling charges and improvements in the auction system. From 1890 until late 1892, the MWA became a trade association whose principal concern was to negotiate an industry wide agreement on brokerage fees and charges. The Association achieved an agreement which was enforced through careful monitoring and a system of penalties for breaches.
However, each member continued to operate as an independent selling agent. The second step began in late 1892 when the Association bowed to continued agitation from the buyers for a central auction room operating under its control. Assuming the central position within the wool market fundamentally altered the nature of the MWA.
Cooperation amongst members was no longer focussed primarily on negotiating and enforcing a price agreement. Henceforth, the Association need to cooperate in the design and execution of a marketing process which offered efficiencies to all participants.
Social capital theory provides a lens through which we can better understand the workings of the MWA and the means by which it created 'economic rents' for its members. 6 This was an institution whose effectiveness resulted from a combination of 'strong' and 'weak' ties, and 'closed' and 'open' networks, applying concepts developed by sociologists that help in analyzing interactions within and between groups. 7 Frequent face-to-face communication between a handful of individuals through the numerous committee meetings of the Association built strong ties. Following the work of James Coleman, we show that internally the MWA achieved high levels of closure within its network, and its cohesiveness fostered a high degree of trust and efficient communication, which in turn reduced the risk of opportunism and shirking. 8 The strong inward or bonding ties were critical in building trust to help mediate inter-firm disputes.
Moreover, strong ties facilitated the construction and acceptance of a binding set of rules and regulations that ensured the governance of the Association and the efficiency of its oversight of wool marketing.
Many of the individuals who represented their firms on the MWA had a multiplicity of roles beyond it. Many were themselves wool growers and stud masters, others sat on boards of non-pastoral related companies, some had been bankers before joining the pastoral companies. Business careers and membership of elite social clubs brought these men into contact men of influence in business, the state bureaucracy and politics.
Knowledge gained in other networks informed the perspective and decision making within the MWA. They were, to follow Ronald Burt, entrepreneurial 'boundary spanners', who could capture the value of an open network, where members span 'structural holes' (gaps) in an array of social networks to access competitive resources otherwise unavailable to a cohesive closed group. 9 These ties beyond the organisation may be 'weak ties', whose value Granovetter articulated; more important for Burt was the location advantage of an actor in the network, rather than the strength or weakness of a tie. Additional social capital for Burt can arise, therefore, 'where people can broker connections between otherwise disconnected segments' to access resources beyond the immediate network. 10 The MWA strength was that it could draw on networks with varying degrees of openness and closure, from ties that looked inward and other ties that looked outward, vesting a wealth of social capital in the MWA for the governance of the wool market.
The paper will discuss the formation and operation of the MWA in the context of the changing strategic imperative in the 1880s and 1890s of the stock and station industry from which the brokers were drawn. 11 The relocation of the wool market to Australia increased the aggregate pool of commission income available in local markets. Firms could have chosen to engage in a price war to increase their market share as independent wool sellers. However, their directors chose to cooperate through the formation of the MWA. The third section provides a detailed account of the workings of the MWA, illustrating how it created and drew on its social capital to generate rents for its members.
The paper then examines social capital creation along the supply chain, particularly the relationship between the MWA and the buyers association. The costs and benefits of association are then assessed. The conclusion briefly explores the impact of the MWA on the firms whose members it represented.
Strategic Imperatives of the Stock and Station Agent Industry
The formation of the MWA in 1890 coincided with a major change in the business model that stock and station agents had employed since the 1870s. For a generation the leading firms in the industry had been both bankers, playing a key role in financing the expansion of the pastoral industry, and commission agents. However, wool production was over extended by the late 1880s. Pastoralists, particularly in the newly settled drier regions, suffered the depredations of overgrazing, plagues of rabbits, and drought. Wool prices also fell. 16 Only Dalgety came through unscathed.
In this context, generating cash from the commission side of the business became a strategic imperative for the industry. If the bulk of Australian grown wool was to be sold locally, the formally independent selling brokers needed to cooperate to create, in the words of an authority on British commodity markets, Graham Rees, an 'organised market' 17 whose efficiency matched that of its major rival, London. From the 1840s when sales of wool commenced in Melbourne, until the formation of the MWA, local selling had suffered from several key defects. Each of the selling brokers ran auctions in its own premises and on its own terms. Despite many attempts to collude on prices, the brokers continued to compete. The ascendancy of the local market needed a central sale room and a uniform set of services offered by brokers, a common set of fees and charges, and dispute resolution arrangements for buyers and sellers. It was the buyers who pushed hardest for fundamental changes in the nature of the market, most notably for having a centralised sales room as existed in London. 18 A Victorian Wool Buyers Association
[VWBA] was formed in 1877, 19 but it seems to have operated on an ad hoc basis before formalizing itself as a rules-based standing committee from 1891, a mirror image of the MWA. 
Bonding Social Capital among the Brokers
The formation of the MWA provided an opportunity to transform existing personal social capital into a synthetic or organisational form of social capital within it, which promised to expedite cooperative strategies where needed and instituted a form of trust not dependent upon the interaction of particular individuals. 25 The membership of the MWA established a shared identity that fostered a commitment to the orderly marketing of wool. Individuals within the MWA acquired information and exercised influence, enhancing personal status and cementing bonds between erstwhile competitors.
Organisationally, the MWA provided a 'strategic network' mechanism for inter-firm governance that set norms, rules, and processes for group competition and cooperation. 26 The MWA attenuated uncertainty and transaction costs within the wool market. However, the maintenance of the social capital created within the MWA was not without cost.
Social capital resources here, as elsewhere, rested on what Bourdieu notes is 'an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed.' 27 The MWA was an Association in little more than name when representatives of the biggest firms met. Taking the first step to form the Association relied on existing stocks of social capital. Ville and Merrett have drawn attention to the social networks and relationships that existed among the senior personnel of Melbourne wool broking firms by the interwar period. 28 Similar connections existed in the late nineteenth century -the propinquity derived from common social background, education, networks, geographic contiguity of workplace and residence, and industry experience. 29 Many of the key individuals in the big stock and station agencies spanned roles, often simultaneously a wool grower, stud master, pastoral entrepreneur and financier. 30 By 1890 the participants in the wool trade had a fair measure of each other's worth, favorably or unfavorably, gleaned from decades of interaction in the spheres of business, club land, politics and family.
The initial impetus to the formation of the MWA was pressure from the buyers for a central sale room and standardised conditions of sale. In turn, selling brokers feared that the recently united buyers would press for lower charges and commissions. The
Association's Rules and Regulations cited its principal objective being to 'maintain uniformity of charges for selling wool…and for the protection of the interests of the members of the Association.' 31 Minutes of the Association's meetings in the first two years reveal that the main business was to get agreement about ending rebates offered to growers and negotiating with the buyers about the conduct of auctions. The Association continued to operate with a minimal set of formal rules. Until mid-1893, the constitution contained only six brief clauses which outlined the objectives of the Association, its membership, procedures for the admission of new members, voting rights, and meetings. 32 During this early period, the frequent interaction of the members dealing with the many issues brought before them created a pool of knowledge about the practices of wool auctions and relations with all parties involved in a process that was still overwhelmingly tacit.
The success of the Association was due to the high levels of commitment given by its member firms during its infancy. The first factor that strengthened the fledgling Association was a realization amongst the member firms that cooperation was preferable to the alternative, a price war between independent selling brokers. Members firms, of whom most were under financial strain, opted for the certainty of the orderly marketing agreements presided over by the MWA. Moreover, the member firms recognized that any serious disruptions to the tightly synchronized timetable of sales within and between selling centres resulting from competition between selling brokers could deter the presence of foreign buyers. The London market, which still sold nearly a half of Australian wool through the 1890s, 33 remained a serious threat. By early 1892, the MWA had finished a two-step process enabling it to serve as the governance structure for wool marketing. It had completed negotiations between its members to agree on a common set of fees and had taken charge of the auction process.
The rules were tightened. A number of smaller selling brokers had their applications to join rejected or withdrew soon after being admitted. 37 The Association had reached a point were it could withstand the shocks arising from the onset of the financial crisis in 1893. As noted above, most of the member firms struggled to stave off bankruptcy and liquidation. Two of the smaller firms were ultimately absorbed into larger competitors.
The Association continued to function effectively despite the heightened uncertainty surrounding its membership. For instance, GM and NZL&MA ceased trading for two months from late June and early July pending their reconstructions. 38 The financial problems arose from poor management of commercial risks rather than from the fraud and corruption that had tainted many businesses during the feverish boom of the late 1880s and the onset of depression. John Horsfall, a director of GM, sailed close to the wind having been accused of embezzlement in 1889 and in 1894 improperly secured a loan of ₤10,000 for his son-in-law. 39 David Elder, the Australian general manager of the NZL&MA, prepared accounts that a British judge declared had been 'calculated to mislead.' 40 However, these behaviours were the exception rather than the rule. There was no systemic loss of trust amongst the member firms or within the MWA.
After the decision to operate a central sales room, the MWA became an institution with a more formal governance structure, the original six constitutional clauses increasing to 34.
This was primarily because the operation of the auction room in the Wool Exchange
Building required members to contribute funds towards its lease and refurbishment.
Thereafter the Association expanded its rules regarding the financial obligations of its members and the responsibilities of those able to operate its bank account. Moreover, the new constitution outlined in more detail the rules of admission of new members and the processes for discipline of existing members. The rules explicitly outlawed members' engaging in non-price competition, such as sponsoring local agricultural and pastoral societies or issuing market reports under their own names, as had occurred before the formation of the MWA. 41 This process of codifying conduct through rules and regulations turned the MWA into a third-party bridging organisation that was independent of the influence of any particular member firm. For instance, Clause 12 of the 1896 Rules and Regulations stated: 'The entire management of the Association and of all its affairs shall be in the absolute control of a Committee, to be formed of one representative or delegate of each member…' 42 In effect, all the signatories accepted that the MWA would exercise a system of associational governance through a process of structured bargaining among members where equality within the institution was paramount. For instance, representation from each member company, voting rights, subscription fees and the posted loyalty bonds that might be forfeited in case of breach were equalised irrespective of the size or market share of members. Moreover, the office-holding positions, including chairman, rotated annually among member firms.
Disputes between member firms were to be handled through transparent processes. There were penalties for breaches of the constitution in the form of escalating fines up to ₤500, and temporary suspensions distinguished the minor from the inveterate offender.
However, there was in reality little recourse to these formal punishments. Members were reluctant to engage in behavior that might warrant serious conflict or expulsion. A willingness to forgive occasional transgressions while expelling more serious or repeating offenders helped to solidify the sense of trust among members and the recognition, by members and external parties alike, of the reputation signals membership conveyed. To prevent member firms introducing vexatious claims, the MWA modified its rules to require accusers to name suspect firms and to forfeit ₤10 if the charge was dismissed. 43 Moreover, voluntary resignation required six months notice, which provided an opportunity for reconsideration and reconciliation. 44 Members sought recourse for 
Management of the MWA and Social Capital Formation
The social capital literature is replete with conjecture and evidence of the role of recurrent interaction through organisations as a stimulus to building trust and cooperation, and in enhancing the capacity of an organisation to act in the interests of its constituents. 46 The minutes of the MWA's deliberations and, after August 1895, those of its Trade Committee permit a closer analysis of such interactions. Two conclusions are clear. MWA's participation rates were extremely high, all the major companies sending a representative to each meeting, with provision for a substitute in the event of an absentee.
Second, the minutes point towards an organisation that was highly interactive, participatory, and based on face-to-face communication, thereby fostering the building of trust and cooperation. The almost complete absence of threats of resignation and an unwillingness to push divisive issues and minority viewpoints to the limit point to a culture of 'voice' and 'loyalty' within the organisation, rather than of 'exit' or 'passivity'.
The 1898 Annual Report explicitly noted that the MWA served as a 'common meeting ground for amicable arrangement of small difficulties which might otherwise grow into grievances…and the resulting increase of uniformity in practice throughout the trade.'
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Participation in the MWA generated rents for its members in a variety of forms. The
Association was an effective mechanism for the reduction of opportunistic behaviour by any of the member firms. As noted above, there was little evidence of any serious or repeated breaches of agreements. The development of close ties within the MWA allowed highly effective monitoring, which imposed discipline upon its members. The prospect of expulsion from the Association, particularly after the establishment of a central auction room, was a credible threat as an outsider would have to bear the costs of running its own sales. Moreover, the Association was able to reduce its members' operating costs.
Marketing costs, such as printing of sale catalogues, placing newspaper advertisements, publishing market reports, making donations to agricultural shows and societies, and sending telegrams of sales results to London, which individual firms had previously borne, were undertaken by the MWA. 48 Acting through the MWA, stock and station agents also used their collective bargaining power to achieve, for example, a reduction in fire insurance premiums and coastal shipping freight rates. 49 While the provision of a central auction room involved additional outlays by member firms in the short term, there were considerable benefits arising from scale economies and tighter scheduling of sales.
Social Capital and Rent Creation along the Supply Chain
The growth of local auctions brought together wool brokers and buyers into new business relationships in Australia as each side embarked on new roles and responsibilities. Selling brokers and buyers transacted with each other daily across a wide range of functions, a situation susceptible to misunderstandings and disagreements in light of the new roles each had begun to play. These activities included how wool was to be displayed for inspection by the buyers, the bidding rules in the auction room, the responsibility for insurance, the terms under which the buyer could examine wool after purchase, charges for unsold wool still in store, the length of the prompt period from sale to clearance on board ship and so on. 50 The challenges of managing these responsibilities and forging new relationships were exacerbated by the pressures exerted from the rapid growth of the wool market. 51 Any protracted delays due to disputes would have had a major impact on the efficiency of the market by creating upstream logjams in the supply chain.
Industry associations of buyers (the VWBA) and brokers (the MWA) provided mechanisms for inter-organisational communication and the negotiation of industry-wide solutions. From its earliest days, the MWA was in regular contact with the VWBA.
However, the degree of commercial and social propinquity amongst the buyers was less evident than among the broking firms. The VWBA's members included representatives from many countries, including the USA, France, Belgium and Japan. Therefore, building trust and cooperation between the two groups in the form of synthetic social capital that reinforced and promoted productive personal relationships was critical, the foundations of which were iterative communications between participants in the industry.
These associations mediated disputes and mitigated their recurrence by establishing greater certainty and standardisation of wool market procedures and practices. When the VWBA was formed, matters of immediate concern to the buyers were discrepancies in bale weights and the terms concerning discount for prompt payment. In so doing, the social capital of the MWA reached back into the workings of the pastoral firms that had created it. The MWA and its Trade Committee became the loci of decision making about matters of vital commercial importance to its members. Companies were bound by decisions made by an autonomous body that practised collective decision making with each member firm having an equal voice and taking a turn as the chairmanship rotated. Member firms delegated authority to a body whose actions might not always coincide with their best interests. The MWA generated a dynamic cohesion that shaped behaviours within its constituent firms rather than being a simple forum for companies to air their views. It presaged industry-wide bodies that were created to act on the other key issues affecting its interests, particularly the acquisition and sale of Australian wool by the government during the First World War. 70 Members of the MWA, such as George Aitken, were prominent in the creation and operation of these industry bodies, whose success might have been uncertain if not for the experience of social capital building that the formation of the MWA had created among many of the industry players.
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